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^ U.S. COUNTERINSLTiGENCY DOCTRINE AND N
INSURGENT INTK4STRUCTURES: PROSCRIBED FAILURE?

A Monograph
by

Major Rex A. Estiiow

'^’^N 2 2 1992

United States Marine Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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177

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ABSTRACT

How well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine
tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures? This
question is important given the high interest of the
United States in maintaining stable democracies around
the world. Insurgency continues to present the most
prevalent type of warfare since the creation of
political states. Current National Security Strategy
cites many counterinsurgencies for which our military
forces must prepare. Defense experts routinely
highlight counterinsurgency as one of the contingencies
on the operational continuum most likely for future
U.S. military involvement.

But, U.S. insurgency/counterinsurgency doctrine
displays a dangerous paradox. Doctrine for U.S. support
of insurgencies highligl j the paramount importance of
building strong insurgenc infrastructures. But, U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine eschews our involvement in
the tactical neutralization of these infrastructures.
Citing vague "historic experience", our counter¬
insurgency doctrine posits popular support as the
insurgent's center of gravity, leaving less important
infrastructure neutralization to host nation forces.

Both insurgents and theorists appear to disagree
with this view. Successful insurgents view their
infrastructures as one of their centers of gravity,
perhaps the most important prerequisite for victory.
Theorists, supporting this thesis, emphasize the
importance of offensive action by the counter¬
insurgents. Furthermore, contemporary experience of
counterinsurgency nations supports the tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

The counterinsurgency experiences of Britain-
Nalaysia, Franoe-Alger ia , U . S . -Vietnam , and Britain-
Northern Ireland provide a valid criteria against which
we can judge the effectiveness of our own counter¬
insurgency doctrine. Each of these counterinsurgent
nations found it necessary to develop tactics for the
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. These
tactics fell into four categories: separation of the
population from insurgents; intelligence collection;
resource control; and deterrence.

The United States must develop acceptable and
effective tactics in each category except deterrence.
Most forms of deterrence, used in counterinsurgency,
are repugnant to American values. They create more
insurgents than they eliminate. We must preserve the
balanced approach to counterinsurgency; but, that
balance must include effective tactical neutralization
of insurgent infrastructures .

•

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Rex A. Estilow USMC

Title of Monograph; U. S. Counteringurgencv Doctrine and
Insurgent Inf raatructurea : Proscribed Failure?

Approved by;

Colonel Dennis K. Hill, MMAS , MSTM.ED

Monograph Director

colonel James rT McDonough , MS

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies

t-L^^ v/-

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D,

Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Accepted

this

day of

1991

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ABSTRACT

But, U.S. insurgency /counter insurgency doctrine
displays a dangerous paradox. Doctrine for U.S. support
of insurgencies highlights the paramount importance of
building strong insurgent infrastructures. But, U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine eschews our involvement in
the tactical neutralization of these infrastructures.
Citing vague "historic experience", our counter¬
insurgency doctrine posits popular support as the
insurgent's center of gravity, leaving less important
infrastructure neutralization to host nation forces.

The counterinsurgency experiences of Britain-
Malaysia, France-Alger ia , U . S . -Vietnam , and Britain-
Northern Ireland provide a valid criteria against which
we can judge the effectiveness of our own counter¬
insurgency doctrine. Each of these counterinsurgent
nations found it necessary to develop tactics for the
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. These
tactics fell into four categories: separation of the
population from insurgents; intelligence collection;
resource control; and deterrence.

The United States must develop acceptable and
effective tactics in each category except deterrence.
Moat forms of deterrence, used in counterinsurgency,
are repugnant to American values. They create more
insurgents than they eliminate. We must preserve the
balanced approach to counterinsurgency; but, that
balance must include effective tactical neutralization
of insurgent infrastructures.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . 1

INSURGENTS' VIEWS ON INFRASTRUCTURES . 7

THEORISTS' VIEWS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY . 16

THE PARADOX OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE . 24

CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE TACTICAL NEUTRALIZATION

OF INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURES . 30

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS . 39

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . 44

INTRODUCTION

Insurgencies arguably present the most prevalent
type of warfare since the creation of political states.
Rising from internal political violence, rebellion,
uprisi.ng, and revolution insurgencies abound throughout
.history. (25:795) Caesar encountered insurgents in Gaul
and Germany. A ferocious Spanish insurgency against
Napoleon in the 19th century added the term "guerrilla"
to the military lexicon. (23:6) Since our own nation's
birth in rebellion, the United States has been involved
with insurgency warfare. Though occasionally this
nation has supported insurgencies, most of our
experience ha's been in support of the status quo
through counterinsurgency.

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts abroad began at the
turn of this century. Our counterinsurgency interest in
the Philippines started upon their ceding from Spain in
1898 and continues today. The United States pursued
counterinsurgency objectives in Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, and Nicaragua throughout the first half of
this century. This counterinsurgency interest in the
Caribbean and Latin America continues. For over twenty
years the United States vainly fought insurgent
revolution in Vietnam. This failure caused the United
States to withdrawal from entanglement in foreign
insurrections. American counterinsurgency policy.

henceforth, provided advice and assistance but eschewed
any U.S. military involvement. (25:796)

But, transnational terrorism, the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
awakened U.S. interest in insurgent conflicts. Reagan
Administration concerns about revolutionary
insurgencies in SI Salvador and Guatemala increased our
interest in counterinsurgency. (25:797) Current
National Security Strategy cites counterinsurgency
concerns throughout the globe, for which our armed
forces must prepare. (3:23) In the operational
continuum, counterinsurgency represents one of the
highest probabilities for U.S. involvement. Throughout
this" century , political concerns for counterinsurgency
have prompted the U.S. military to develop counter¬
insurgency doctrine.

Perhaps the earliest attempt to document what has
become counterinsurgency warfare was Colonel C.E.
Calwell's, "Small Wars- Their Principles and Practice".
This extensive study, written in 1906, documented
military counterinsurgency actions back to the Little
Big Horn. (19:10) Marines used it, along with their own
extensive counterinsurgency experience, to publish the
Small Wars Manual in 1940. This manual, called "one of
the finest documents written on counterinsurgency
before World War II", contains many of the essential
elements of today's Internal Defense and Development

Strategy . (19:10)

The Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
Strategy governs U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. It
covers the full range of measures taken by a nation to
protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgencv. The IDAD Strategy focuses on promoting the
growth of viable government institutions, responsive to
the needs of their society. IDAD turns on the premise
that insurgencies can be defeated bv removing any
legitimate cause of the insurgents. (31:2-13)

IDAD concentrates on civil programs, which promote
growt.t through balanced political, economic, and social
programs. The IDAD Strategy assumes popular support as
the shared center of gravity, for both the insurgents
and the government. Hence, government military
activity, even though it may contain a tactical
neut ra 1 1 2 1 t ion effort, must be circumscribed to
minimize collateral damage on the general population.
Tactical military action focuses on internal security
with a minimum use of force. (31:2-16) This •
proscription profoundly impacts on U.S. counter-
insurgency doctrine.

Though effective counter insurgencv programs do
require a balanced approach, the IDAD strategy may
underestimate the requirement for effective tactical
military action. First, the IDAD Strategy presumes that
all insurgencies arise from legitimate social causes.

* n

It then assumes that the insurgency will fail if these
legitimate causes are preempted or removed. The logic,
here, is based on the notion that popular support
comprises the insurgent's only center of gravity.

But many authors on insurgency and
counterinsurgency disagree with this notion. They
propose the insurgent’s infrastructures as t.he
insurgent's true center of gravity. These
infrastructures provide for the complete strategic,
operational, and tactical direction of the insurge.acy.
If true, U.S. tactical counterinsurgency doctrine,
based on the IDAD Strategy, may not effectively deal
with insurgent infrastructures.

This monograph seeks to answer the question: Hew
well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine tactically
neutralize insurgent infrastructures?

This question is important because experts
consistently view counterinsurgency, and other low
intensity conflict missions, as the most probable for
future U.S. military involvement. Increased Third World
sophistication with chemical weapons and nuclear
weapons proliferation serve to increase the stakes of
insurgency around the world. Finally, current U.S.
problems in counterterrorism and counternarcotics share
with counterinsurgency the problem of tactical
neutralization of infrastructures.

The next section of this monograph presents an

• ^

analysis of three important insurgent revolutions of
the 20th century: the October "',917 Revolution in
Russia; the Communist Revolution in China, and the
Communist Revolution in Vietnam. Using Marxist-Leninist
doctri.ne and t.he works of Mao and Ho Chi Minh. this
studv will demonstrate the importance that insurgents

p lace

the

i r own

infrastructures .

The

th i

rd sec

tion of the monogr

aph

ana 1 y ze s

the

works

mil

i tary

theorists studied

the School

Advanced Military Studies. This purpose is to extract
any insight or benefit from theory on the
coun t e r 1 nsurgencv problem.

Next, the study reviews U.S. counter insurgencv
doctrine. It seeks to determine how we expect to
effectively neutralize insurgent infrastructures at the
tactical 1 eve 1 .

The fifth section of the monograph presents the
criteria for effectiveness. This criteria consists of
those effective tactical neutralization measures found
necessary by other nation's military forces, while
combatting insurgencies. These criteria were developed
from analysis of the following counterinsurgency
examples; Br i tain-Malays ia , France-Alger ia ,

U . S . -Vi etnam ; and Britain-Northern Ireland.

The final section compares the criteria with U.S.
doctrine for the tactical neutralization of insurgent
infrastructures and presents conclusions. This section

illuminates how well we are prepared for

counterinsurgency operations by answering the research
question How well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine
tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures?

INSURGENTS ’ VIEWS ON INFRAS T RUCTURE S

Insurgents view their own infrastructures as one
cf their centers of gravity, perhaps the most important
prerequisite for vicrory. (5;1C5 Political and military
infrastructures initiate and sustain insurgencies at
each level of war. Regardless of categcrv, organi¬
zation, or phase of insurgency, the infrastructures
provide the discipline, plans and leadership required
for success. Each major contributor to t.he theory and
practice of modern insurgencv and revc lut icnarv war
highlighted this importance.

Insurgencies normally fall into three categories
based on the insurgent objective: national liberation;
social revolution; or separatist movement. (5:11)
Insurse.ncies based on national liberation involve a
move to expel a foreign power or influence. Social
revolutions turn on a substantial injustice and often
result in civil wars. Separatist insurgencies struggle
for the succession of a homogenous ethnic or religious
minority. The ultimate goal of each category is
political change. The infrastructures articulate this
change and organize the tactical forces for it. The
driving ideology in each case is nationalism. (5:2)
Successful leadership organizes to strike this chord.

Insurgencies normally organize along one of two

lines; conspiratorial or mobi 1 i zat ional (25;801). Each
requires a dedicated, highly organized cadre. The
difference between the two involves the degree of mass
movement required by the insurgent situation. The
Leninist and Foco models of insurgency relied on the
former method of organization. Mao and the Vietnamese
dau tranh model epitomized the mobi 1 i zat ional
organization. Regardless of organization, insurgencies
normally progress through four phases.

These four phases are usually characterized by the
tactics employed; propaganda, terrorism, guerrilla
warfare, and mobile warfare. (25:815) But these phases
also can be differentiated by the degree of
infrastructure organization, which makes the
increasingly violent tactics possible. Throughout the
insurgency, organization is actually more important
than ideology or military tactics. Seizing power by
disabling society provides the constant focus of the
organizational effort. (24:220)

The first two phases, propaganda and terrorism,
concentrate on building the political infrastructure.
Propaganda and basic organizing activity characterize
the initial phase. The trusted cadre forms and pays
special attention to recruiting from the
intelligentsia. For security, both the conspiratorial
and mob i 1 i za t i ona 1 organizations develop cellularly
during this first phase.

Terrorism characterizes the second phase. By

demonstrating government weakness and insurgent
tactical strength, the insurgent hopes to gain popular
support. (25:806) His primary goal is to alter the
behavior and attitudes of targeted groups. (25:802) He
creates concern among those segments of the population,
who are otherwise satisfied. (30:3-24) Provoking a
disproportionate government response serves as an
alternate goal. (25:806) His organization now contains
highly compartmented strike forces and he begins to
recruit from the wider segment of the middle class. His
immediate organizational goals are to solidify t.he
growing infrastructure and expand his resource base.
(30:3-14) Throughout these first two phases, propaganda
and terrorism focus on organization not agitation.

(5:15)

Guerrilla warfare characterizes the third phase
of an insurgency. Mobile, lightly armed tactical forces
target government troops. This traditional weapon of
the weak normally succeeds militarily only where
government response is inadequate. (25:803) By proving
the government's inability to obtain battlefield
success, the insurgents widen their military base.

Mobi 1 izat ional organizations begin to establish
parallel government cadres at every level. Propaganda
continues. Insurgents depict their own aggression as
liberation and characterize government response as a

protraction of the conflict. (24;219) Successfully
active guerrilla operations sustain the morale of the
fighting forces and expand their ranks for the final
phase of insurgency.

Mobile conventional warfare is supported not just
by large military forces but more importantly by a
complete and total political infrastructure. The
insurgency is now more like a civil war or even a war
between nation states. Once the insurgent reac.hes this
stage, defeat looms large for the government. Three
great revolutions of the twentieth century highlight
the importance of infrastructure, through each phase of
insurgency.

The Communist Revolutions of Russia, China, and
Vietnam serve as models for most contemporary insurgent
situations. They represent the most successful
insurgencies of the 20th century and provided
innovative contributions to the art of insurgency. The
success of the Marxist-Lenist revolution in Russia
proved the importance of a highly organ i zed . vanguard
element. Mao demonstrated the revolutionary potential
of mobilizing the agrarian masses. In Vietnam the dau
tranh strategy proved the power of political and
military mobilization of every member of a society.

Each of these successful models demonstrated the
overriding importance of insurgent infrastructures for
the strategic, operational, and tactical direction of

insurgencies. A forth example, the Foco model failed
everywhere but Cuba, precisely because it scorned this
importance .

The first great revolution of the 20th century
marked the beginning of Soviet Russia. Lenin
successfully founded his revolution on a small, well
disciplined, well organized, conspiratorial group. His
revolution required no mass mobilization because the
class dialectic of history would destroy the
government. (30:3-6) The struggle "captured" these
ready masses and controlled them with an "Iron party".
(4:137) But the masses were used for the will of the
party, not vice versa.

For Lenin, the leadership struggled for power not
ideology. Once in power, he used revolutionary ideology
and cited the threat of counterrevolution to remain in
power. (4:96) This required a strong infrastructure as
the most important element of the revolution. Strict
discipline crushed any "f ract ional i sm" or dissent.
(4:190) The narrowly organized party focused on almost
unitary leadership. (4:191) Lenin wanted his new order
to perform all of the coercive functions of the old
regime . (4:181)

The center of gravity of this revolution was
clearly the revolutionary vanguard. Lenin felt that
revolution could only be made with a central, well
disciplined party. (4:185) The force of history would

mobilize the masses. He greatly feared the vanguard's
loss of leadership to a "Red Napoleon". (24:146)
Therefore, the party needed to galvanize both political
and military control of the state. All subsequent
communist revolutions built on Lenin's October 1917
model . (4:172)

The second great revolution of t.he 20th century
occurred i.n China. Mao's greatest innovation to
revolutionist thought used the agrarian, Asian masses
to support the revolution. (30:3-17) He recognized that
China's general situation differed from that of October
1917, so he adopted the required mob i 1 i za t i cna 1
organization .

Mao recognized that his mob i 1 izat ional revolution
required a long protracted war. (18:191) Not only did
the formidable enemy situation require this, but he
also needed a more extensive organizational effort to
mobilize the masses. His war required centralized
strategic planning and direction of operations and
battles. (10:184) The leadership would maintain the
"total war objective" through three stages of warfare:
guerrilla, mobile operations and conventional. (18:193)

Often cited as the source of the notion that the
people are the center of gravity to an insurgency, Mao
did not believe this. His commonly quoted analogy
claimed the insurgent's need to move through the people
as the fish through the sea. But he clearly saw his own

infrastructure as his true center of sravity. Like
Lenin, he believed that only one leadership, the
communist party, could bring victory. (18:90) Also
like Lenin, Mao focused political and military
authority in that one leadership. (18:92) Furthermore,
Mao recognized the destruction of the regular army as
the enemy's center of gravity.

For Mao, the true aim of war was "to preserve
oneself and to destroy the enemy". (13:230) To do this
the enemy must be disarmed and deprived of his means to
resist. The center of gravity that Mao wished to
preserve was his i.nf rastructure , not the people. The
people merely provided an "inexhaustible supply of
resources for the requirements of war". (18:240) For
this reason they were the richest source of power to
wage war. (18:260) Time was on the side of the
insurgency, not because of the people, but because his
infrastructure would be preserved. The infrastructure
would enable him to absorb tactical setbacks by flowing
from one tactical stage of insurgent warfare to
another .

The final great revolution of the 20th century
triumphed in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and the other
architects of the dau tranh strategy of revolution for
Vietnam, sought to forge an entire people as an
instrument of war. They fought to control the people,
forge them into a weapon, then hurl them into

batt le . (24 ; 20 ) But Ho did not rank support of the
people as the first prerequisite for insurgent victory.
He valued organization, time and terrain much more.
(24:219) Once again the infrastructure valued the
people only as expendable resources with which to wage
war. (24:215) Ho extolled the legacy of Lenin for
providing the organizational principles, theory, and
tactics of a revolutionary party. (3:234)

The infrastructures of this revolutionary party
forged a weapon of people with a combination of
political and military dau tranh, which they saw as
"systematic coercive act i v i ty " . ( 24 : 217 ) This armed
struggle eliminated anyone as a simple on-looker. It
forced all to contribute to the struggle. (24:215) But
once again the true center of gravity of the revolution
was the political and military infrastructures. How
could the U.S. win every battle and still lose the war?
Defeat of armed dau tranh was not enough; political dau
tranh must be defeated also. As long as the
infrastructure survived, the struggle continued at
each level of war. (24:222)

One exception, the Cuban Foco movement, sought to
avoid the time and work required to build strong
infrastructures. The guerrilla force served as the
party. Immediate tactical action would destroy the
decadent regime and organization would follow after the
guerrilla force seized power. Though Foco proved

.19

successful in Cuba, it has failed wherever else it has
been applied. In over twenty cases, the lack of
organized infrastructures resulted in failure, when
faced by resolute government action. (25:826)

Insurgents clearly viewed their own infra¬
structures as essential to their efforts. (5:10) At
each stage of the insurgency, building the infra¬
structures received primary attention. Insurgents
placed more value on infrastructure than on ideology or
tactics. Lenin, Mao, and Ho Chi Minh led successful
revolutions based on the scope, complexity, and
cohesion of their infrastructures. (14:308) The common
political direction, integrated plans, and discipline,
provided by their infrastructures, enabled them to
continue their fights. Organization compensated for
material shortages. (14:808) Government responses,
which did not effectively neutralize their
infrastructures, could not defeat their revolutions.

THEORISTS’ VIEWS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY

Many theorists have addressed insurgencies. In his
monumental On Mar, Clausewitz wrote directly of
insurgencies in his books on "Retreat to the Interior"
and "People in Arms". He was the first theorist to
explicitly address insurgency. (13:130) Directly or
indirectly, Clausewitz provided the basis for most
subsequent theories of insurgency. (23:11) Mao used
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu extensively to develop a
successful strategy for China's Communist Revolution.
(11:45)

Like Clausewitz, Sun Tzu said much about
conventional warfare, which 'has relevance for
counterinsurgency. T.E. Lawrence amplified much of Sun
Tzu and Clausewitz in writing of his insurgency
efforts. Eric Hoffer and Crane Brinton gave us insights
into the personalities and organizations necessary for
successful infrastructures. Analysis of these works
highlights for counterinsurgency operations the
importance of tactically neutralizing insurgent
infrastructures .

Clausewitz analyzed guerrilla warfare as a
component of an insurgency (general uprising) from the
point of view of the insurgent. (13:129) For him,
insurgency represented the natural progression of
warfare toward the absolute since the French

revolution. It "broadened and intensified” war. (6;479)
Clausewitz recognized the large psychological element
of insurgency. He noted that for those who employed it,
insurgency gave a measure of superiority over those,
who would disdain its use. (6;479) He also was the
first theorist to note the politicized nature of an
insurgency. (13. 129)

Clausewitz viewed insurgency primarily i.n
conjunction with conventional operations. (6:48) It was
the defense of last resort against invasion. (13:129)
Clausewitz felt t.hat recourse to insurgency should be
weighed carefully, because t.he people would suffer
greatly from both enemy and insurgent action. (6:470)
Sun Tzu also pointed to the extreme civil consequences
of (insurgent) war- inflated prices, rates of wastage,
difficulty of supply, all burdening the people. (11:40)
Therefore, the very character of the people had to
support this particular type of fighting. (13:131)

This great hardship to the countryside exerted a
great moral impact against the insurgent. Only strong
insurgent leadership and tight organization could
overcome this. (6:470) Clausewitz recognized that the
contravening moral impulse of the insurgent
infrastructures was essential to a successful general
uprising. (13:130)

Analysis of Clausewitz’ key concepts for
conventional warfare provides more insights for

counterinsurgency. His paradoxical trinity helps us
understand the counterinsurgency environment. His
discussions on the canter of gravity and the sphere o;
influence of a victory suggest the importance of
tactical neutral ioat icn of insurgent i.nfrastructures .
Clausewitc' discussion on the relative strengt.h of
defe.nse ever offense provioes guicar.ee to selecticr. c:
correct counterinsurgency tactics.

Clausewitc' paradoxical tri.nitv offers an
i.nteresting framework for analysis of the
counterinsurgency problem. In conventional warfare, tne
people provide t.ne passicn and the will for tne
struggle. The armv and its commander provide the genius
and the creative spirit. The government provides the
"element of subordination", the restraining influence,
which alone subjects the process to reason. (6:39) The
counterinsurgency problem has the same trinity, but
their respective roles differ.

In counterinsurgency, the passions of the people
form the object of the struggle not the driving force.
The moral impetus (passion) for the struggle comes from
the insurgent infrastructures. (13:130) The government
does provide a restraining influence cn its army, but
not the insurgent infrastructures. The creative genius
and the passicn of the insurgent infrastructures roam
free, but those of the Army may be severely
circumscribed. Government action to correct perceived

problems can have a positive impact on the people, but
their passions do not exert the driving force behind
the struggle. The infrastructures, as long as they
exist, provide the passion and the creative genius in
the struggle for the peoples' support.

Clausewitz' concepts of center of gravity and
sphere of influence of a victory also have relevance to
counterinsurgency. These two concepts relate closeiv to
one another. To successfully end a struggle, the sphere
of influence of a victory or a series of victories must
i.nclude the opponent’s center of gravity.

For Clausewitz. the center of gravity represented
those dominant factors, which composed the enemy's
means of making war. It represented the opponent's
cohesion. The center of gravity included only those
factors, which far exceeded all others in making war.
(3:484) For conventional operations, the center of
gravity was normally the opponent's fighting forces,
then his territory. (6:90;596)) The threat of an
opponent raising new forces required the occupation of
his territory.

A victory over another objective, the capital, a
province, or public opinion would be decisive only if
its sphere of influence included the true center of
gravity- the fighting forces. The struggle would
continue until a victory’s center of gravity directly
or indirectly removed fighting forces from the

battlefield. (6:405) Brinton confirmed this for the
insurgents, when he stated that they must eventually
defeat in battle or subvert the government's armed
forces to win. (2:39)

The insurgency's political and military
infrastructures provide its cohesion. Ue have already
seen that the insurgents recognized t.his trut.h.
Clausewitz cautioned that the ma]or act of strategic
judgment was to distinguish centers of gravity and t.he
spheres of i.nfluence of victories of each of them.
(6:486) What then should be the objective of cur
coun t e r - .nsu rgency effort? This is the mcsc important
question in counteri.nsurgency for as Bri.nton told us:
insurrections succeed only where the government
response is inadequate in its use of force. (2:86)

Clausewitz stated that i.n an insurgency, the
leadership was its center of gravity, because of its
effect on public opinion. (6:596) Hoffer agreed that
leadership was indispensable. Though leadership needed
a genuine cause, a single man with iron will, daring,
and vision, could make a movement. (14:103-106)
Clearly, the leadership and cohesion provided by
insurgent infrastructures embody the center of gravity
for an insurgency.

Clausewitz thoughts on attack and defense also
provide relevant insights to the counterinsurgency
problem. He accurately portrayed the insurgency as a

strateaic defense. (6:482) As the inferior force, the

insurgent alone benefits from the relative superiority
of the defensive posture. Conversely, Clausewitz would
argue that counterinsurgency forces must be offensive.
"There can be no war if both sides seek to defend
t.herase 1 ves . " (6:216)

The i.nsurse.nt focuses cn terrain objectives,
expandi.na his influence over the people. He avoids the
clash with government forces because his goal is to
spread over geography, while remaining nebulous and
elusive. (13 131) Sun Tzu counseled that the weaker
( insurge.nt force "should move as a e.ncst in the
starlight." (11,48) Lawrence elaborated on this theme,
describing his insurgent force as an "ether". (16:7)

The negative aim of this defensive strategy puts time
on the side of the insurgent (6.480).

3v yielding terrain when he is weak and striking
only when the situation assures victory, the insurgent
fulfills Sun Tzu's tenet of breaking the enemy's will
before the fight. (11:39) Thus, the weaker insurgent
focuses on terrain, which he can yield without
permanent i.njury and only becomes force oriented when
prospects are propitious. In this manner, the insurgent
deepens t.he battlefield out of proportion to his
numbers. (IS 3) This enables the insurgent to retain
the tactical initiative, even wh ile his forces gain
strength from his strategical Iv defensive posture.

How do counterinsurgency forces arrest this
advantage from the insurgent? Reliance on social change
alone to eliminate legitimate grievances of the people,
though required, may not be enough. (23:40) Remember,
Clausewitz would argue that counterinsurgency forces
must be offensive. (6.216) Often, counterinsurgency
forces focus on terrain. But securing or garrisoning
terrain in an attempt to hold the popular support of
the people, only diffuses the strength of the
counterinsurgency forces. Lawrence highlighted this
with his "doctrine of acreage". (15:198) Clausewitz
predicted failure for t.his strategy because of the
increased drag, friction, and complicated tactical
choices produced by large numbers of troops. (6:472)

Are counterinsurgency efforts doomed to fail? The
theorists think not. Clausewitz boldly announced: "One
need not hold an exaggerated faith in the power of a
general uprising, nor consider it as an inexhaustible,
unconquerable force, which an army can not hope to
stop." (6:481) For example, if the insurgents
concentrated unwisely, the army could crush it. The
people would then lose heart and desert the cause. Sun
Tzu agreed that the opposing force would fold quickly,
once it lost the initiative. (11:50)

Counterinsurgency strategies and operations must
provide for t.he tactical neutralization of insurgent
infrastructures. These infrastructures provide the

dominant cohesive elements for the strategic,

operational, and tactical direction of the insurgency.
The tactical neutralization of insurgent infra¬
structures is required to make the counterinsurgency
effort force-oriented. This alone gives the
counterinsurgency forces opportunities for victories,
whose sphere of influence most directly impacts on the
insurgency's true center of gravity. As Clausewitz
stated, "National uprising cannot maintain itself where
the atmosphere is too full of danger." (6:482)

THE PARADOX OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

An analysis of U. S. doctrine for
insurgency/counterinsurgency yields an interesting
paradox. Doctrine for U. S. support of insurgencies
highlights building and sustaining insurgent
infrastructures as the most i.mportant element for
strategic, operational, and tactical success. (28;9-6)
Conversely, U. S. counterinsurgency doctrine counsels
avoidance of tactical neutralization of insurgent
i.nf ras tructures . (31:2-40)

T.h i s section will illuminate this paradox by first
briefly presenting U.S. doctrine for the support of
insurgencies. This is found primarily in FM31-20,
Doctrine for Special Forces Operations and FMlOO-25,
Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. Then, it
will highlight counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasizing
U.S. provisions for the tactical neutralization of
insurgent infrastructures. U.S. counterinsurgency
doctrine is primarily found in FMlOO-20, Mi 1 i tarv
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict and FM90-8,
Counterguerrilla Operations .

FM31-20 and FMlOO-25 provide guidelines for U.S.
forces deployed in support of insurgencies. Each also
provides guidance for counterinsurgency operations. The
paradox exists even within these manuals. It's as if
those, who write on how to support an insurgency, do

not talk to those who writs on counterinsurgency.

FM31-20 discusses resistance movements,
orchestrated by the United States, to oppose or to
overthrow an established government. The movement's
goal is to cause a government withdrawal of power
throughout t.he countrv. FM31-20 posits the center of
gravi-v cf a resistance movement as t.he people's will
to resist. (23:9-2) =ut . the manual recognizes t.hat
insurgent infrastructures embody that will. The manual
states that insurgencies do not require a just cause.
Effective infrastructures and outside support will
"mcbilioe t.he cause' as well as the people. '(23:9-2)

Success in U.S. sponsored insurgency requires
centralised direction of all strategic, operational,
and tactical action combined with decentralized
execution. It places high demands on organization and
leadership. (29:9-7) FMlOO-25 stresses that U.S.
sponsored insurgencv focus on subversion: undermining
the military, economic, psychological, and political
strength of a nation. It highlights that insurgent
infrastructures provide the key to all subversive
activity. (32:3-4) The central issue is first control,
then legitimacy. Strong infrastructures will turn what
is low intensity conflict for the U.S. into total war
for the resistance movement. (23:9-2)

Paradoxically, t.hese same manuals then retreat
from the importance of insurgent infrastructures, when

they discuss counterinsurgency. FM31-20 provides for
direct action like sniping against individual
insurgen-cs ; but, it does not discuss the systematic
tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

FniOO-25 e.mpha3izes the need for a secure
environment but eschews "tactical operations" aimed
sole.v at oestrcying insurgent combat forces in their
base areas. (32:3-11) Both manuals recognize the
importance of insurgent infrastructures, when building
an insurgency; but, they prefer to ignore or down-play
tactical neutralization in the counterinsurgency arena.
This theme to limit U . S . involvement in tne tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures receives
further emphasis in FMlOO-20, Military Operations in
Low Intensity Conflict . •

FMlOO-20 seeks no U.S. involvement in the tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. Such
involvement would represent a transition to war from
low intensity oonflict and cast the United States in
the role of invader. (31:2-41) Avoidance of this
transition to war is apparently more important than
effective counterinsurgency. For both FMlOO-20 and its
companion volume. FM9O-0. Countersuerr i 1 1 a Operations,
explicitly recognize the importance of infrastructures
to insurgencies.

FM90-9 recognizes the i.-nportance of military and
political infrastructures to direct the frustrations of

even a dissatisfied population. It states that

populations in need of change are not enough for
insurgency. Insurgents must only gain the passive
support of the people. Therefore, the probability of
insurgent success rises, if governments fail to control
these infrastructures. (29:1-2)

FMlOO-20 agrees that insurgent leadership
transforms disaffected people to an effective political
and military force. (31:2-3) Denied infrastructures,
the insurgency will collapse. (31:E-2) FMlOO-20
concedes tactical neutralization of insurgent
infrastructures as an important component of the host
nation's counterinsurgency strategy. But it eschews any
U.S. involvement in the neutralization effort.

(31 ;2-41 )

Neither FMlOO-20 nor FM90-8 offers advice for the
tactical neutralization of these important insurgent
i.nf rastructures . FMlOO-20 recommends host nation
security operations to isolate and protect the people.
(31:2-22) FM90-8 seeks to neutralize guerrilla forces,
while ignoring insurgent infrastructures. (29:1-5) Both
manuals tactically ignore what our theorists and
insurgents themselves see as the insurgency's center of
grav i ty .

In fact, FMlOO-20 posits the center of gravity of
an insurgency as the popular support of the people,
which confers legitimacy to one side .or the other.

(31:2-7) It apparently seeks to treat an insurgency as
an extension of the elective process. The
counterinsurgency goal of FMlOO-20 is to defeat the
infrastructures by eliminating any legitimate causes of
insurgency. (31:2-13,14)

This may place U.S. counterinsurgency forces in an
untenable position. U.S. doctrine for counterinsurgency
may not come to grips with the insurgency’s true center
of gravity. At best, our doctrine recognizes the
requirement for tactical neutralization of insurgent
infrastructures, but seeks to avoid this necessity.

Our doctrine admits that timely discovery of
insurgent infrastructures and their destruction ends
the insurgency. (31:2-9) Yet paradoxically, the same
doctrine limits U.S. counterinsurgency assistance to
intelligence sharing, communications support,
humanitarian assistance, civic action, and intertheater
lift. (31:2-34)

"Destruction of the infrastructures and
elimination of the conditions which cause the
insurgency must be the domain of the host nation's
armed forces." (31:2-41) FMlOO-20 makes a vague
reference to "historical experience" to support this
proposition. But does the historical experience of the
United States and other nations involved in
counterinsurgency efforts support this proposition?

The danger, if it does not. is twofold. The United

States may be ill prepared to judge the accepta bility
and effectiveness of tactical neutralization methods
chosen by host nations. Worse, U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts may fail because we have not adopted an
effective doctrine for the tactical neutralization of
insurgent infrastructures. The next section will
analyze historical experience with the tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE TACTICAL NEUTRALIZATION

OF INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURES

A study of selected, contemporary insurgencies
yields many examples of tactical neutralization methods
found necessary for successful counterinsurgency
operations. These effective tactics for neutral izaticn
of insurge.it infrastructures provide a criteria against
which we can evaluate our own doctrine. This section
presents the development of this criteria.

This section first presents an analysis of
counter i.nsurgency efforts in general and t.he tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures
speci f ical 1 y . Then, it reviews example neutralization
tactics, organized in the following groups: separation
of population from infrastructures; intelligence
collection; resource control; and deterrence.
Counterinsurgency forces developed these tactics in the
following cases'; Br i tain-Malays ia ; France-Alger ia ;

U. S . -Vietnam; and Britain-Northern Ireland.

These cases were selected as the contemporary
examples of counterinsurgency most relevant to U.S.
doctrine. France-Alger ia was chosen for its general
acceptance as the extreme use of tactical military
force to neutralize insurgent infrastructures. Also,
the French experience in Algeria directly affected our
own selection of tactics in Vietnam. (1:49) U.S.

experience in Vietnam with the tactical neutralization
of insurgent infrastructures required inclusion because
it foreshadows our doctrine today. In fact, some
authors believe that our failure in Vietnam stagnated
any 'J.3. growth in counterinsurgency. (20:ii)

The British experience in Malaysia merited
inclusion because of its common regard as the model of
an established democracy successfully quashing a
revoluT: ionary insurgency. Also, Britain closely
reflects the government institutions and social values
of the United States. Tactical neutralization methods,
used by Great Britai.n, may fi.nd acceptance by t.he
United Sates. Finally, Britain-Northern Ireland was
selected as an ongoing insurgency in which tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures has not
stopped t.he insurgency completely, but has turned the
insurgencv back from a more advanced phase. Analysis of
these cases provides a valid criteria for the tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

An analysis of contemporary counterinsurgency
efforts provides conclusions relevant to an evaluation
of our own counterinsurgency doctrine. First, each of
t.hese insurgent situations necessitated a balanced
approach to counterinsurgency operations. Second, they
established beyond dispute the primacy of political
considerations and the importance of unitary civilian
control of the total counterinsurgency effort. But most

importantly for this study, contemporary

counterinsurgency operations ratified the need for a
strong military effort to tactically neutralize
insurgent infrastructures.

The selected counterinsurgency efforts universally
endorsed a balanced c iv i 1 -mi 1 i tary approach toward
combatting insurgencies. The first order of business
for the incumbent government consistently remained
improvement of its own political machinery and
administrative capabilities. (9:64) Even hard-bitten,
counterinsurgency campaigners in Algeria admitted that
securi.ng t.he population's confidence required more t.han
military force. (27:11)

Britain's successful counterinsurgency efforts in
Malaysia proved invaluable the integration of civil
administration, armed forces, and police into a
coordinated team wit.h a unified plan. (22:7) Our own
experience in Vietnam confirmed this. Some French
military accounts of the Algerian insurrection disputed
this necessity; but, more thoughtful French observers
advocated an integrated civilian and military staff
lead by a civilian. (9:90) Although most contemporary
counterinsurgency efforts stressed a balanced
counterinsurgency approach under civilian control, they
also elaborated on the need for tactical neutralization
of insurgent infrastructures as a very important part
of that balanced.

Insurgent infrastructures provided all resources
for the insurgency in addition to its strategic,
operational, and tactical direction. As the sole
procurers and distributors of personnel, food, and
arms, the insurgent infrastructures became the first
target for elimination. (26:31) The fight for popular
support started here.

In Maiavsia and Algeria popular support began with
safety, not good will. The first priority of the
counterinsurgency effort became protection, rather than
assistance. (9:14) Propaganda and even civil works were
i.neffective absent a proven ability to protect. (27-49)
Most counterinsurgent forces found that the goodwill of
the people directly related to the government's resolve
to protect them. (26:146) They found that the people
excused normally intolerable measures, if they proved
effective. (26:147)

The necessary corollary to this was that no
effective measure hurt the people more than the
insurgents. For example, large scale "search and clear"
tactics proved ineffective in Malaysia and Vietnam
because they normally created more insurgents than they
killed. (26:35) Even in Algeria, counteri.nsurgency
forces learned to reject tactics, which did not promote
positive contact with the people. (27:73) In Ireland
the British developed habitual relationships between
specific units and regional populations. (12:167)

Successful counterinsurgency tactics avoided collateral

damage. Rarely did counterinsurgent forces profit from
the use of artillery or close air support. (9:93)

Counterinsurgency tactics needed to be offensive
and they also needed to threaten insurgent
infrastructures to be effective. The goal of offensive
counterinsurgency tactics was to force insurgents to
focus on subsistence and protection of their
infrastructures. (26:117) To do this, counterinsurgents
developed effective tactics in four major categories:
separation of population from infrastructures;
intelligence collection; resource control, and
deterrence. Furthermore, as the France-Algeria
experience proved, effective tactics had to be
responsive to the law of war and the counterinsurgent
nation's political sensibilities.

The population required physical, psychological,
and political separation from the insurgent
infrastructures. Physical separation normally began
with a complete census of the population and
identification documentation. (9:94) Since youngsters
were often used as couriers, counterinsurgent forces in
Algeria issued picture identification cards to all
civilians over eleven years of age. The counter¬
insurgent forces then posted each building with picture
documentation of its inhabitants. (26:144) This began
the psychological separation of the population from the

insurgent infrastructures.

Family heads were held accountable for the
activities of their families or those who lived in
their buildings. (27:29) In Malaysia and Algeria this
focus on fixing responsibility initialed the positive
i.nvc I veme.nt of t.he people with the counterinsurgent
authcri-ies. (10.119) Counterinsurgent forces
progressively increased the requirements of the
population for self protection until the people became
full partners in the counterinsurgency effort. For
example, i.n Malaysia local populations were organiced
to fix damage resulting from insurgent sabotage. Once
physical and psychological separation had begun,
political separation became effective.

Counterinsurgent forces used civic action to hold
areas that were tactically cleared by the military.
Increased civic action also dampened harsher physical
separation measures. Relocation of populations or
military fortification of strategic hamlets garnered
acceptance by the people, if accora}.. aied by better
living conditions. In rural Malaysia, strategic hamlets
succeeded in separating the populations physically,
psychologically, and politically. Strategic hamlets
failed in Vietnam because their locations did not
proceed from a secure, strategic base. They also failed
because insurgent infrastructures were locked into the
hamlets with the people, rather than neutralized

tactically. (26:141)

The moat concerted effort to tactically neutralize
insurgent infrastructures in Vietnam failed because its
focus perverted to body counts, leaving insurgent
infrastructures in tact. (21:46) The Phoenix Program,
much maligned in fiction, consisted of a four-pronged,
i.ntegra'cad approac.h to neutralize insurgent
infrastructures: an intelligence program to identify.; a
tactical program to apprehend; a legal program to
restrain; and a detention program to confine. (21:27)
Failures like Phoenix in Vietnam did not negate;
however, t.he requirement for intelligence collection
focused on neutralizing infrastructures.

Cnee securely separated from insurgent
infrastructures, people in Malaysia and Algeria began
to feed counterinsurgent forces tactical information.
The primary essential element of information for
tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures
was the name of the insurgent's next higher cell
member. (7:76) But, French tactical intelligence
collection activities in Algeria relied heavily on
torture. This proved counterproductive. Other nations
found that specially trained interrogators could
legally extract confessions, once they rejected abusive
practices and the notion of unconditional surrender.
(22:8) Infrastructure members were more easily "turned"
if rigorously examined but treated well and offered

conditional amnesty. (21:61) The intelligence supplied

by a secure population enabled counterinsurgent forces
to tactically control required insurgent resources.

The inability to produce resources, especially
food and arms, constituted an inherent insurgent
weakness. Expanding che census to include farm animals
and transport modes, counterinsurgents successfully
used food denial as a weapon in Malaysia and Algeria.
(22:3) With convoys and other controls on bulk foods,
counterinsurgents forced insurgents to subsistence
levels. (26:144) Movement control of the population
combined wic.h food rationing prevented insurgent
infrastructures from supplying their forces. (22:94)
Sometimes success required draconian measures. Rice was
cooked before rationing, so it would spoil if saved;
and likewise, canned goods were punctured. But a safe
population tolerated these measures and counter¬
insurgent forces easily "turned" coerced smugglers.
(26:146) In fact, the tolerance of safe populations
seemed stretched only by deterrence tactics.

Burning villages, massive roundups, and
concentration camps, like massive collateral damage
from high-tech weapons, created more insurgents than
they eliminated in Algeria. (7:23) Neither torture of
suspects nor reprisal demolitions of homes impacted on
insurgent infrastructures. (7.46) Even British
internment of IRA suspects without trial precipitated

adverse reaction from the population with no
concomitant impact on infrastructures. (17:86) More
humane collective punishments- curfews, restricted
shopping hours, nuisance patrols- needed to be
carefully controlled and expeditiously curtailed to
remain effective. (22:54)

Contemporary counterinsurgencies have required the
balanced approach advocated by the U.S. Internal
Defense and Development Strategy. The experience of
other nations confirmed the wisdom of a unified
counterinsurgency effort under civilian control. But
for each counterinsurgency studied, tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures formed an
important part of that balanced approach. Effective
neutralization tactics conformed to the law of war and
fell into four categories: separation of the population
from the insurgents; intelligence collection; resource
control; and deterrence.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine does not
effectively neutralize insurgent infrastructures.
Paradoxically, our doctrine recognizes the critical
importance of insurgent infrastructures for the
centralized strategic, operational, and tactical
direction of the insurgency. But under the Internal
Defense and Development strategy, we relegate tactical
neutralization of these infrastructures to host nation
f orcee . This presents two dangers: First, U.S. military
forces have no frame of reference for t.he effectiveness
of neutralization tactics, which may be employed by
host nation forces. Second, we are not prepared to
execute our own neutralization program if required by
host nation failure.

Resolution of this paradox may require doctrinal
change. Our doctrine states that avoidance of tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures is based on
historic experience. However, the historical,
counterinsurgency experience of other nations does not
support this contention. Even our own experience in
Vietnam belies our doctrine today. The counter¬
insurgency specialist, Edward Landsdale, cited Phoenix
as a failure because it was implemented amateurishly
and strayed from systematic infrastructure
neutralization. (21:65)

U.S. military doctrine for counterinsurgency
complements the Internal Defense and Development
strategy. Like other nations, the United States
recognizes the need for a balanced counterinsurgency
approach with a unified plan, directed by civilian
leadership. Unlike other nations, we apparently have
removed the tactical neutralization of insurgent
infrastructures from this balanced approach. This may
require rethinking because of the importance of
insurgent infrastructures.

Insurgent infrastructures provide strategic,
operational, and tactical direction for i.nsursenc ies .
Furthermore, these infrastructures procure and
distribute all personnel, food, and arms for the
insurgency. Clearly, these infrastructures embody the
most important source of cohesion for the entire
insurgency effort.

We have seen that theorists and insurgents alike
cite this focal point of cohesion as a center of
gravity. Cohesive infrastructures enable insurgents to
flow from one phase of insurgency to another, putting
time on the side of the insurgent. Insurgent
infrastructures may even embody the single center of
gravity, which successful counterinsurgents must
influence with their victories. These infrastructures
provide the insurgent's capability to retain the
tactical initiative, while gaining strength through the

strategic defensive.

To arrest the insurgent's initiative, we must find
an effective way to take the tactical offensive.
Neutralization of insurgent infrastructures would
provide us tactical victories, which also would have
great operational and strategic impact. Tactical
neutralization of infrastructures would help to remove
t.he benefit of time from the insurgents by precluding
their ability to flow from one phase of insurgency to
another. Effective neutralization tactics would force
the insurgents to concentrate their inferior forces to
protect their infrastructures in a battle for their
existence .

These effective tactics for infrastructure
neutralization must not cause collateral damage among
the population. They must conform to the rule of law
and promote positive contact between the armed forces
and the people. Historically, counterinsurgent forces
have developed successful neutralization tactics in the
following categories; separation of the people from the
insurgents; intelligence collection; resource control;
and deterrence. Successful tactics enabled the
counterinsurgents to become force-oriented, rather than
terrain-oriented.

The first three categories of neutralization
tactics remove from the insurgents benefit derived from
Lawrence's "doctrine of acreage". Tactics, which imply

garrisoning territory, should be rejected. Counter¬
insurgency forces must provide safety for the
population, through the tactical neutralization of
insurgent infrastructures. A safe population normally
becomes active in its support for the

counterinsurgency. The safe population's support can be
reinforced and expanded through civic action. This
highlights the c i v i 1 -mi 1 i tary balance required for
successful counterinsurgency efforts.

The fourth category of tactics, deterrence,
requires special attention. Most forms of deterrence,
used i.n counterinsurgency, are illegal and repugnant to
American values. These should be carefully proscribed.
Some evenly applied collective punishments, like
curfews or restricted shopping hours, may find
acceptance with a population convinced of the
government's honest resolve to protect. But, even
relatively benign restrictions may prove counter¬
productive. Neutralization tactics aimed at deterrence
may have no place in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine;
however, "balance" in counterinsurgency may still
require the effective tactical neutralization of
insurgent infrastructures.

If so, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine must more
accurately reflect this balanced approach. Current
doctrine emphasizes civic action for the resolution of
insurgent situations. Though civic action should

receive primacy, military action for the tactical
neutralization of insurgent infrastructures must not be
neglected. Our counterinsurgency doctrine should
explicitly delineate effective and acceptable
neutralization tactics. We must explicitly develop
acceptable and effective tactics for separation of the
insurgents from the population, intelligence
collection, and resource control.

The highly politicized nature of counterinsurgency
warfare makes this especially important. Improvisation
of effective neutralization tactics may prove
impossible. Doctrinally approved, effective tactics
would reduce the possibility of error in support of
host nation neutral ization efforts. More importantly,
doctrinally approved, effective neutralization tactics
may prevent our own failure in future counterinsurgency
situations. Doctrine, which eschews this necessity, may
proscribe failure for future U.S. counterinsurgency
efforts .

' 9_

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